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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) and 
(5) to entertain a writ of certiorari from decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals. The date of 
entry of the decision to be reviewed is December 29, 2006 as 2006 UT App. 513. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 27, 2007 to address the issue of the statute of 
limitations. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented for determination by this Court are the following: 
1. If a new product is modified during the course of its installation at the 
customer's place of business and such modification makes the product 
defective and unreasonably dangerous, does that modification constitute part 
of the sale of the product such as to make the product subject to the Utah 
Product Liability Act, including its two year statute of limitations? 
2. Is a new product, which requires some installation work as part of the sale, 
covered by the Utah Product Liability Act if it is the installation work which 
causes the product to be rendered defective and unreasonably dangerous? 
These issues were ruled upon by the trial court and also made one of the central parts 
of the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. Thus they have been preserved for 
decision by this Court. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3: A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within 
two years from the time the individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, 
or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1): No product shall be considered to have a defect or to 
be in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product which made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent City of Hurricane ("City")1 filed its Complaint on July 10, 2003 in the 
Fifth District Court of Utah for the County of Washington. After Defendant/Petitioner 
Wheeler Machinery Company ("Wheeler") filed a Motion to Dismiss, the City filed an 
Amended Complaint and the Motion to Dismiss was denied. Discovery followed thereafter, 
at the conclusion of which Wheeler filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. That Motion was 
granted by the trial court in a Summary Ruling dated May 3, 2005, which was made into a 
1
 Plaintiff/Respondent is officially designated in the pleadings as "Utah Local 
Government Trust," a company in the business of securing insurance for governmental 
bodies. However, all of the activities at issue were carried on by the City of Hurricane and 
its employees and thus Plaintiff/Respondent is generally described in all the pleadings as the 
City. 
2 
final Order of Dismissal dated May 23,2005. The City filed its Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals on June 10,2005. The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court on 
June 24, 2005, but then transferred back to the Utah Court of Appeals on June 30, 2005. 
After briefing and argument, the Utah Court of Appeals on December 29, 2006 entered its 
decision, which is reported as 2006 UT App. 513, which overturned the trial court's decision 
and denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. A Petition for Certiorari was then filed with 
this Court, which Petition was granted on April 27, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is Wheeler's Statement of Facts relative to the issues to be decided by 
this Court on certiorari. The case involves the sale of an auxiliary generator system by 
Wheeler to the City, initially consisting of two generators each enclosed in its own structure. 
Thus Wheeler's initial written bid in early 1999 called for supplying both the system as well 
as the two enclosures on a turn-key basis. (R. at 247.) The City then decided to house the 
generator system in a larger building which would also be used for offices and storage. (R. 
at 197.) Wheeler's written bid was therefore revised in April 1999 to reflect that change. (R. 
at 197.) After the building plans became available, which did not occur until August 1999, 
it became necessary for Wheeler to revise its bid a number of times, which it did orally. (R. 
3 
at 197-198.)2 Thus Wheeler sold to the City a functioning electrical generator system, 
powered by two diesel generators and including all of the piping, tanks, mufflers, and other 
component parts necessary to make the system operate. (R. at 228.) The City has 
consistently referred to what Wheeler provided as constituting a single sale. (R. at 23 8-239.) 
Wheeler paid Richard Carlson of Independent Welding to obtain the necessary 
exhaust pipe and to weld some flanges on the pipe. (R. at 275.) Richard Carlson also welded 
so-called rain caps to the exhaust pipe just above the roof line to cover what the industry calls 
a "thimble," a metal insert in the roof which allows the exhaust pipe to pass through the roof. 
(R. at 267-268.) As part of welding on the rain caps to the exhaust pipe, Mr. Carlson cut off 
a portion of the two rain caps on both sides of each cap so that they would fit within the 
structure supporting the mufflers.3 (R. at 269-270,283.) It is this modification which has 
been identified by the City as making the exhaust system defective and unreasonably 
dangerous and being the instrument which caused the fire. (R. at 44, 311.) After all of the 
generator equipment was in place and installed, Wheeler then had the responsibility of 
starting and testing the whole system, which startup and testing occurred around January 1, 
2000. (R. at 321-322.) The fire which is the reason for the instant lawsuit occurred on 
August 3, 2000. (R. at 3.) 
2
 Even though the City ultimately agreed to buy the generator system from 
Wheeler, at no time did the City sign a contract or provide a written acceptance of any 
Wheeler quote. (R. at 196-97,432-35.) 
3
 See the schematic drawings found in the Record at 283 and 431, and collectively 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Complaint in this case was filed on July 10,2003, almost three years after the fire 
in question, and thus beyond the two year statute of limitations for product liability cases. 
The City claims that it is not bound by the two year product liability statute of limitations, but 
rather by the four year negligence statute of limitations. However, the product at issue 
consisted of a fully operational generator system sold as a single sale. The modification work 
which the City says caused the fire at issue was performed as part of the sale of that system. 
The City further claims that the modification work, which occurred as part of the sale, made 
the system defective and unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the sale falls squarely within 
the terms of the Act and the City's claims should be barred. In connection therewith, the 
Court should consider adopting either a usability test or an essence of the transaction test to 
define when a product has been sold and is subject to the Utah Product Liability Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRODUCT AT ISSUE CONSISTED OF A GENERATOR SYSTEM. NOT 
COMPONENT PARTS 
The Utah Product Liability Act ("Act) provides that "[n]o product shall be considered 
to have a defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold . . 
there was a defect or defective condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(1) (2002). 
Claims brought pursuant to the Act must be filed within two years "from the time the ... 
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claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, both the harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. 78-15-3. Wheeler contends that 
the City's claims are barred because they sound in products liability. The City does not deny 
it filed its complaint well after the two year statute of limitations imposed on products 
liability claims. Further, both the City and the Court of Appeals have acknowledged that 
under Strickland v. General Motors Corp^ 852 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Utah 1994), the 
products liability bar covers not only products liability claims but also all associated claims 
that could be brought as a result of a product defect, including negligence claims. Strickland 
at 959; Utah Local Govt. Trust v. Wheeler Mach. Co., 2006 UT App. 513, If 11, 154 P.3d 
175. It is Wheeler's position that this case involves a new generator system sold to the City, 
one or more components of which the City itself claims were defective and unreasonably 
dangerous to the City. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on several bases, including statute of 
limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, among other things, that "the product 
sold to the City was the various components of the generator system, which components were 
not defective at the time of sale." Utah Local Govt. Trust at <|f 15. That raises the issue for 
this Court: how does the Act apply to the sale at issue? 
A. The Court of Appeals opinion did not define what is a sale and when it occurs. 
While the Act underlines the importance of a product's condition at the time it was 
sold, the Act does not define the term "sale" or otherwise identify when a product has been 
6 
sold. Nor does the Act identify at what point a sale occurs when the product being sold is 
a system consisting of many component parts. This case squarely raises the issue because 
it is undisputed that the product sold by Wheeler to the City was a complex power system 
consisting of generators, piping, tanks, mufflers, and other components. The opinion issued 
by the Court of Appeals does not resolve the issue because it likewise does not define "sale" 
or "sold," as used in the Act. Instead, the Court of Appeals used a number of other words 
and phases as apparent equivalents. For example, the opinion speaks of putting goods "into 
the stream of commerce," having the goods "turned over," and relinquishing "some control 
over the component parts" in a context strongly suggesting those terms are interchangeable 
with "sale" or "sold" under the Act. 2006 UT App. 513 at 1f 14. The Court of Appeals 
further failed to explain how these other apparently interchangeable terms satisfy the 
statutory language. Thus the opinion gives no guidance, for example, on how relinquishing 
"some control" over component parts of a larger system is the same as a sale of those parts 
separate and apart from the sale of the system as a whole. 
B. The Court of Appeals opinion improperly introduces new facts. 
The Court of Appeals opinion concludes, without citation to the Record, that "clearly" 
the subject "assembly and installation work" was not "performed by Wheeler before the 
systems were put into the stream of commerce, i.e., turned over to the City." 2006 UT App. 
513 at Tf 14. (Emphasis in original.) On the other hand, the Record does support the fact that 
the startup and testing of the system by Wheeler occurred around January 1,2000, some two 
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months after the work at issue in this case was done. (R. at 321.) Hence the question: where 
is the evidence for the Court of Appeals' finding that the work at issue did not occur before 
the system was turned over to the City? 
It should be noted that the Court of Appeals does not cite to anything in the Record 
which supports the conclusion that the City took delivery and possession of certain 
components of the system being sold by Wheeler. Although there is evidence in the Record 
that certain component parts were delivered to the work site, there is no testimony about their 
status other than that they were onsite being stored for Wheeler until they were installed and 
made a part of the whole power system. There certainly is no testimony that any of the 
components were ever paid for separately prior to their being installed and the system being 
rendered functional. Thus, at the very least, there would have to be factual findings on that 
point before the Court of Appeals could reach its conclusion. Moreover, the Court of 
Appeals even disregarded the City's own position that all of the components were part of a 
single sale of a generator system. Utah Local Govt. Trust at f^ 14. If as a legal proposition 
delivery of component parts of a system to a job site constitutes a completed sale of those 
parts, and possibly of the entire system, then that proposition turns a number of legal 
principles on their head. It is submitted that such is not a fair reading of the Act. Because 
the product being sold by Wheeler was a complete system, the summary judgment granted 
by the trial court should be upheld on the basis of the statute of limitations. On the other 
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hand, if there remains a factual issue, then the Court of Appeals' decision is at best merely 
a guideline to be applied once the facts are established. 
C The generator system was sold as a single product* 
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the City has admitted and even argued that the 
entire generator system was provided as a single sale, not a series of sales of component 
parts. 2006 UT App. 513 at f^ 14. This is supported by the City's own Request for Bid, 
which defines as what it was seeking to purchase being a power generator system. (R. at 
296, 352-355.) It is also supported by the very nature of the generator system sold by 
Wheeler. That system consisted of many component parts, each of which were of little value 
standing alone but without which the entire system could not properly function or operate. 
For example, without functioning generators, the rest of the system could not create 
electricity. Without the exhaust system in place,4 the generators could not safely exhaust the 
fumes created by the generators. The fuel tanks would have no value without functioning 
generators. In short, it took all the components to make a functional electrical generating 
system, which generator system was not in place and delivered to the City or rendered 
useable until every part had been completely installed and the system was tested and turned 
4
 Although Wheeler has claimed that Richard Carlson of Independent Welding, 
who performed the modification work on the rain caps at issue in the case, did his work 
under the direction of the City, it is the contention of the City that Carlson was directed and 
controlled by Wheeler. Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, the City is bound by its claim 
that Wheeler directed and controlled the installation and assembly not only of the generator 
sets but also of the entire exhaust system. 
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on. Thus, as the City itself has argued and the Court of Appeals has noted, this case involves 
the single sale of a defective product which is claimed to have been unreasonably dangerous. 
The modification and/or assembly of that product was merely part and parcel of that single 
sale. 
D. Jamison v. Spencer R. V. Ctr., Inc. supports Wheeler 3s position. 
In holding that the defective part of the generator system had been "sold" to the City 
prior to the modification work, the Court of Appeals erred in several ways. In analyzing that 
portion of the Court of Appeals' decision, it is important to note that the only precedent it 
cites for its position is the Oregon case of Jamison v. Spencer R. V. Ctr., Inc., 779 P.2d 1091 
(Or. Ct. App. 1989). The case involved a seller of a new trailer hitch who welded the hitch 
on to the plaintiffs vehicle. It was undisputed in that case that the weld that allegedly failed 
was made during the seller's installation of the hitch. 
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals misread or at least misapplied Jamison. In 
reaching its conclusion that the product liability statute of limitations rather than the 
negligence statute of limitations was applicable, the Oregon court distinguished the earlier 
Oregon case of Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974). 
Hoover involved the improper mounting of non-defective tires. The Jamison court noted that 
in its situation, the welding of the trailer hitch to the truck made the hitch defective, whereas 
in Hoover the new tires remained non-defective, but the existing car, which was not part of 
the sale, was the thing made defective by the improper installation. Jamison, 779 P.2d at 
10 
1092. In like manner, to the extent the modification of the rain caps in the instant case is 
classified as installation work, that work made the product being sold - the generator system 
as a whole - defective.5 
E. The product at issue was modified, not merely installed. 
Jamison emphasized that the trailer hitch had been modified. Likewise, the product 
at issue in this case was modified prior to its being installed. In other words, it is not a 
question of improperly installed rain caps but rather a question of improperly modified rain 
caps, which modification work occurred just prior to the caps being installed. It was the 
faulty modification work which rendered the whole system defective. The City and the Court 
of Appeals referrred to the problem as being faulty installation work, but nowhere does the 
Record support that claim. Nothing in the Record suggests that the way the exhaust pipe was 
bolted to the generators or to the mufflers, the way the thimbles were inserted into the roof, 
or the way the rain caps were welded to the exhaust pipe was faulty. Rather, the City in 
paragraph 9 of its Amended Complaint defines the problem as consisting of the cutting off 
of pieces of the rain caps before they were attached to the exhaust pipe. (R. at 44.) The City 
itself has claimed that the generator system was "substantially modified" when the work in 
question was performed. (R. at 44.) Thus, applying Jamison as a precedent, the fact that the 
5
 In its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals refers to "the installation of the 
nondefective exhaust system." Utah Local Govt. Trust atf 15. (Emphasis added.) However, the 
complaint states that fire was caused by the defective modifications to the exhaust system. (R. at 
44.) 
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system was rendered defective by a modification of some of the component parts is sufficient 
to trigger liability under the Act. 
F. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted Jamison in at least two ways - locale of the work 
and after-sale work. 
In relying heavily on Jamison for its decision, the Court of Appeals focused on two 
theories, neither of which, however, are supported by Jamison. It first seems to argue that 
in order for the Act to apply, the defective work has to occur before the product leaves the 
seller's premises. Thus it noted that the hitch in Jamison had been welded at the defendant's 
shop before the truck was picked up by the plaintiff. Utah Local Govt Trust at f 13. A 
careful reading of Jamison, however, shows that the Oregon court was not focused on the 
locale of the installation. Its focus was on the fact that as the hitch was being attached to the 
customer's vehicle, the hitch was also being modified. Moreover, location is not a rational 
way to determine products liability. For example, the Hoover Court rejected a claim of 
product liability even though the products at issue, namely tires on an automobile, were 
installed at the defendant's place of business. On the other hand, many large, complex pieces 
of machinery, like the Wheeler system, must be assembled or installed at the customer's 
chosen site. However, this does not mean, as the Court of Appeals' concluded, that the seller 
has turned control of each component part over to the buyer before the whole unit is made 
useable. Especially in the situation where the seller has specific installation expertise and 
knowhow, no sale is complete until the seller has properly and completely put all the parts 
together in a functional manner and made the product useable. 
12 
The locale question was clearly put to rest in the subsequent Oregon case of 
Brokenshire v. Rivas & Rivas, Ltd, 142 Or.App. 555, 922 P.2d 696 (1996). That case 
involved the installation of an acrylic floor in a customer's bakery. The defendant in that 
case argued that it had provided a service, not a product. The court, relying on Jamison as 
resolving the issue, specifically held: 
The process of making the acrylic floor need not be distinguished from its installation, 
because defendant's role was to manufacture on site the floor that it sold to Birnbach. 
It was the floor itself that was dangerously defective. 
Id. at 700. Thus the Brokenshire court made clear that locale was not a determining factor. 
The Utah Court of Appeals also focused its analysis of the Jamison case on the second 
part of the opinion which, essentially as dicta, stated that after-sale work is not covered by 
product liability. Applying Jamison, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that because the 
defective work in question occurred after some of the component parts had been delivered 
to the site and installed by the City, the defective modification at issue occurred after the sale. 
However, in Jamison, the court defined after-sale work as follows: 
For a seller, that time does not begin until the product leaves the seller's hands, 
regardless of the date of the sale contract. Plaintiff has not alleged that he used the 
trailer hitch before it was assembled and installed on his truck. 
Jamison, 779 P. 2d at 1093. There is no question in the instant case that the City did 
not use the generator system, nor could it be used, until some months after the work in 
question had been completed and the entire system had been tested and turned on by 
Wheeler. As in Jamison, the City has not alleged that it used the generator system before it 
13 
was fully installed into the City's building. Nor was the acrylic floor in Brokenshire used 
by the buyer before it was fully in place. Therefore, the reliance by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on Jamison to deny Wheeler's statute of limitations argument is misplaced. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A NEW RULE 
It is submitted that since the issue presented by this case is one of first impression and 
involves the interpretation of a Utah law whose language is not necessarily uniform with 
similar legislation in other States, it would be appropriate for this Court to provide specific 
guidelines under the Act with regard to the definition of a sale and when it is completed. The 
test should be one which has broad application, which is easy to apply, and which is not 
dependent on technical issues. 
A. The test of usability 
Wheeler first suggests a test founded on the concept of usability. If a new product is 
not useable by the customer in its anticipated fashion before it is installed, and if in the 
course of being made useable by the seller as part of the sale it is rendered defective and 
unreasonably dangerous, it should be covered by the Act. For example, in Jamison, the court 
noted that the plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged that he used the trailer hitch before it was 
assembled and installed on his truck." Jamison, 779 P.2d at 1093. Thus, the Oregon court 
concluded that any negligent installation occurred before the product had left the seller's 
hands. Id In the Utah case of Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115,61 P.3d 1068, this Court 
14 
found that an x-ray machine was not defective at the time it was initially sold to the plaintiff, 
noting that the plaintiff had "used the ... machine without problems for several years prior 
to its reinstallation . . . ." Alder at ^[23. {See also Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. 
Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784,785 (Tx. 1998) (in analyzing whether electricity was placed into 
stream of commerce, the court noted it had been rendered useable to customers by way of 
transformer reducing voltage from 35,000 volts to 110-220 volts). 
As noted above, the Wheeler system was complex and involved many component 
parts. Each component part was essentially useless until installed together with the other 
component parts. Even the largest components, namely the individual generators, were 
essentially useless without fuel tanks and an exhaust system. The City did not use, and could 
not have used, the Wheeler system until it had been completely installed and turned on. That 
included all the work associated with the exhaust system, which in this instance the City 
claims was done defectively. Thus the defective work had been completed and made a part 
of the generator system before the sale was effectuated, bringing the product under the ambit 
of the Act. 
B. The essence of the transaction test 
As an alternative, Wheeler suggests that the Court could also adopt the "essence of 
the transaction" test utilized by many States6 to determine whether a particular transaction 
6
 See, e.g.,Ayyashv. Henry Ford Health Systems, 533 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. App. 1995); 
Persichiniv. BradRagan, /we, 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 
180 Cal.App.3d 493 (1986); Furch v. GeneralElec. Co., 142 A.D.2d 8 (N.Y.A.D. 1988). See also 
the unreported cases of Plas-PakIndustries v. Prime Elec, 2006 WL 2677838 (Conn. Super 2006) 
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sounds in products liability or falls under some other theory of recovery, such as negligence. 
Using this test, courts examine the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant to decide 
whether the transaction at issue is primarily the sale of a product or of a service. If the 
parties' relationship is found to be that of buyer and seller, then products liability theories 
apply. Ayyash v. Henry Ford Health Systems, 533 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. App. 1995). If the 
relationship is that of service provided to the one served, then negligence theories apply. Id. 
Because many transactions are hybrid in nature, "the controlling criterion . . . is whether the 
primary purpose of the sales transaction was the sale of goods with the rendition of labor or 
service only incidentally involved or whether, in contrast, the rendition of services was the 
primary or dominant purpose of the sale." Persichiniv. BradRagan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168,174 
(Colo. 1987). 
Applying the "essence of the transaction" test to the instant case, it is clear that the 
parties' relationship was one of buyer and seller. Wheeler as seller sold a product to the City 
as buyer. While installation was part of the transaction, the primary reason for the 
transaction was the sale of a product, namely a functioning generator system. Therefore, 
under the essence of the transaction test, the City's claims sound in products liability, and the 
products liability statute of limitations should apply to such claims. 
It is submitted that either of the two tests suggested herein, which have been used in 
other jurisdictions, should be adopted. In fact, the two tests are consistent with each other 
(not reported); Doerflein v. Six Flags Great Adventure, 2006 WL 392980 (N.J. Super. 2006) (not 
reported). 
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and are not mutually exclusive. Applying either of the tests to the instant case would not 
only be in keeping with the Act but would also be consistent with the previous precedent set 
by this Court in Alder. In that case x-ray equipment and other laboratory equipment which 
had been purchased some time earlier was installed at a new location. The Alder Court 
essentially applied the usability test, holding that the products liability statute of limitations 
did not apply since the plaintiff "used the . . . machine without problems for several years 
prior to its reinstallation " 61 P.3d at 1076. The essence of the transaction in Alder was 
to provide a service - moving and re-installing an existing machine - not to sell a product. 
Applying either test to the instant case would cause the City's claims to be barred by the two 
year products liability statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic purpose behind the Act is to address liability for new products which at the 
time they leave the seller's hands are unreasonably dangerous to those who acquire them. 
If a product being sold is rendered unsafe during installation by the seller, the product is just 
as unsafe as if it had been manufactured at the seller's facility in a defective condition. 
Indeed, the principal and overriding characteristic of such an arrangement is the sale of a 
useable product, for which service or installation is a minor part. On the other hand, once 
a product has been rendered useable in the hands of the buyer, any further work by the seller 
should not fall under the Act. Likewise, if an existing product is being serviced, or as in 
17 
Alder, being moved from one location to another and the principal purpose for which 
compensation is being given is service, then negligence rather than product liability standards 
should control. In this case, under either the usability or the essence of the transaction tests, 
the sale at issue was of a complete generator system, not a few pieces of pipe or a few rain 
caps. Further, because the City's claims concern a faulty modification of part of the 
generator system, which modification was made prior to when Wheeler started up the system 
and turned it over to the City, under Jamison a sale of a defective system is at issue. Thus 
under any test, the City's claims should be governed by the Act. Because more than two 
years had run before the complaint was filed, the case should be dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds. 
DATED this i ^ x d a y of June, 2007 
KESLER & RUST 
i2Q=4 
osoph C. Rus 
x)rneys for Petitioner Wheeler Machinery 
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ORME, Judge: 
Hi After a roof fire at its power plant, Appellant Utah Local 
Government Trust (the City)1 brought a claim against Appellee 
Wheeler Machinery Co. (Wheeler). The City alleged, under 
negligence and contract theories, that Wheeler was responsible 
for the exhaust system modification that caused the fire. The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wheeler, and the 
City now appeals. We reverse. 
1. Utah Local Government Trust secures and oversees insurance 
for many publicly owned properties. One of those properties is 
the Hurricane City power plant, the property involved in this 
case. Because the actions in issue were those of Hurricane City, 
we refer to Appellant accordingly. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The City hired Wheeler to supply two generator sets to the 
City for its power plant, including the entire exhaust system. 
It was later determined that the mufflers, which were part of the 
exhaust system, were too heavy to be installed on the power 
plant's roof as the plans had originally intended. This problem 
was addressed by installing wooden supports and C-channel metal 
frames on the roof to help support the weight of the mufflers. 
Thus, each exhaust pipe ran from a generator, through a thimble 
placed in the roof, and to a muffler resting on the wooden 
supports and a metal frame cradle. A rain cap was also installed 
atop the thimble to keep moisture from entering the building 
through the gap between the thimble and the exhaust pipe. 
%2 Richard Carlson of Independence Welding installed various 
parts of the exhaust system, including the rain cap. During the 
installation, however, Carlson discovered that the rain cap was 
too large to fit within the metal frame cradle supporting the 
muffler. To ensure a proper fit, Carlson cut off about one-half 
inch on two sides of the rain cap. Carlson later submitted an . 
invoice to Wheeler--not the City--for his work on the exhaust 
system, including his work on the rain cap. Wheeler paid the 
invoice without argument. 
1(4 On August 3, 2 000, several months after the generators were 
put into operation, a fire started on the roof, resulting in 
extensive damage to the building and equipment. The fire was 
caused when the modified rain cap directed the heated air toward 
the wooden supports.3 In 2003, the City brought suit against 
Wheeler for negligence and breach of contract, claiming Wheeler1s 
installation of the exhaust system was faulty. Wheeler 
thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial 
court granted, and the City timely appealed. 
2. " f In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. *" Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. 
v. Liberty W. Dev. , Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 
1993)) (alteration omitted). We recite the facts accordingly. 
3. There is some suggestion that the generators overheated and 
were, to some degree, the cause of the fire. Such a claim, 
however, would clearly be barred by the two-year product 
liability statute of limitations, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 
(2002), and we therefore do not address it. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^5 The City argues that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there were controverted issues of material fact. 
"Because a summary judgment challenge presents only legal issues, 
we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness. We 
consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law 
and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact 
existed." Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 
970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Factual Disputes 
^6 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further specify what 
type of evidence is required to oppose summary judgment and to • 
establish that there are genuine issues of material fact: 
[Ojpposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. . . . When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party failing to file such a response. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, in the face of a motion to strike 
or other timely objection, " [s]tatements made merely on 
information and belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion 
testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at the 
trial may not properly be set forth" to establish a disputed 
issue. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973). Failure to produce acceptable 
evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact will 
result in a grant of summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e) . 
f7 The trial court determined that the City had failed to meet 
the standards of rule 56(e), reasoning that the City's memorandum 
"cited to materials which are not properly considered in the 
context of summary judgment" and "exaggerated, and . . . 
occasionally misrepresented, the substance of the material 
cited." The court therefore determined that the City had failed 
to appropriately show any disputed issues of material fact, and 
the court granted summary judgment in favor of Wheeler. Although 
we sympathize with the trial court's frustration regarding the 
City's memorandum,4 we determine that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because the City did produce sufficient admissible 
evidence to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact.5 
4. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required the City to repeat 
verbatim each fact presented by Wheeler and then to succinctly 
address why the City did or did not agree with that fact. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The City's adherence to this rule 
was uneven at best. As a result, it is often difficult to 
discern whether the City was actually disagreeing with a fact 
stated by Wheeler or only disagreeing with the fact's legal 
significance. 
Further, as noted by the trial court, there are several 
instances where the City exaggerated the material contained 
within the cited portion of the record. Fcr example, the City 
asserted that "[t]he City, Alpha Engineering and the general 
contractor could not make a move without input from Wheeler." 
Despite its colloquial tone, this is not language from the 
record, but rather is the City's exaggerated summary of testimony 
that the City had been waiting for Wheeler to provide the 
smokestack design and that Wheeler representatives participated 
in a meeting regarding the issue. Unfortunately, such 
exaggeration and other liberties with the record continued with 
some frequency in the City's brief on appeal. 
5. The trial court noted its hesitation in granting summary 
judgment based on noncompliance with rules 7 and 5 6 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that appellate courts do not 
always enforce these rules. We recognize that the Utah Supreme 
Court has, using harmless error analysis, reversed a summary 
judgment that was based on noncompliance with the technical 
requirements of rule 7. See Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready 
Mix, Inc. , 2004 UT 23,1(23 n.4, 89 P. 3d 155 (referencing rule 4-
501(2) (B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which was 
the previous repository of the current rule 7 requirements) . And 
we further recognize that there is some resulting uncertainty 
about whether the trial court ever has discretion to grant 
summary judgment based on simple noncompliance with the 
(continued..,) 
^8 Most significantly, the City's memorandum sets forth 
evidence showing that there are disputed issues of material fact 
regarding the installation of the exhaust system, particularly 
with respect to whether Carlson was working at Wheeler's behest 
when he modified the rain cap. For example, the testimony of 
Wheeler's Robert Spears indicates that he hired Carlson on behalf 
of Wheeler. And Carlson testified that the invoice for his work 
on the rain cap was paid by Wheeler without dispute. These 
facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, would support the conclusion that Carlson was acting as an 
agent of Wheeler when he modified the rain cap. 
1[9 Wheeler argues that, at most, it paid for some of Carlson's 
work as part of the give-and-take in the project, but that 
Wheeler was never contractually responsible for the installation 
or resulting payment. Therefore, Wheeler argues, the retained 
control doctrine protects it from any liability because it was 
not directing Carlson's actions. See Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 
22,1(19, 979 P.2d 322 ("[A] principal employer is subject to 
liability for injuries arising out of its independent 
contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or 
asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted 
work. I!) . 
^10 In this case, however, there is sufficient evidence to 
create a question as to the applicability of the retained control 
doctrine. First, an invoice notation suggests that Wheeler's 
agents gave verbal approval for Carlson's work. Second, the 
City's retained expert, Richard McPherson, stated that Don 
Johnson, a City employee, indicated that the direction to "make 
5. (...continued) 
formalities of rule 7. See Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., 
Inc., 2004 UT App 354,^15 n.2, 101 P.3d 371, cert, denied, 123 
P.3d 815 (Utah 2005). We do not, however, see the same 
incertitude regarding noncompliance with the requirements of rule 
56. We find no case where an appellate court has reversed 
summary judgment when the opposing affidavit did not present 
evidence appropriate under rule 56(e) and the moving party had 
timely objected to such deficiency. See generally Strange v. 
Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979) ("[I]f the opposing party 
does not move in a timely fashion to object to affidavits or 
strike them and hence they are admitted, then that party waives 
the right to show that they do not comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."). Nor do we see how a failure to 
show the existence of disputed issues with facts "admissible in 
evidence" could be deemed harmless. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Indeed, the rule itself provides that summary judgment shall be 
entered when an appropriate response is not filed. See id. 
it fit" came from Wheeler's Spears, also strongly suggests that 
Wheeler was directing Carlson's actions.0 Further, Spears agreed 
that "any installation by Wheeler of the exhaust system was part 
and parcel of the installation of the generators and the exhaust 
system sold to the plaintiff as a single sale,"7 which certainly 
supports the view that Wheeler was contractually responsible for 
at least some portion of the installation. Finally, if it is 
determined that Wheeler was responsible for the portion of 
installation that included the rain cap, then Wheeler would 
clearly be liable for Carlson's modification of the rain cap 
regardless of who actually directed Carlson to make the 
modification. See First Am. Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. 
Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1987) (» [C]ourts agree that a 
party who delegates his duties under a contract to a third person 
is not relieved of his responsibilities, but rather remains 
ultimately responsible to the party with whom he contracted for 
guaranteeing the successful execution of the contractual 
duties.1'). Thus, when the evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the retained control doctrine 
does not support summary judgment in favor of Wheeler. 
6. The statements by McPherson regarding Johnson's statment are 
not "obviously inadmissible hearsay," as characterized by the 
trial court, nor "double hearsay" as argued by Wheeler. In fact, 
the statements are not hearsay at all. McPherson's statements 
relaying what Johnson said are non-hearsay because Johnson, who 
was available to testify at trial and would have been subject to 
cross-examination concerning the matter, said he had no 
recollection of conversations regarding the rain cap 
modification. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1). Furthermore, 
Johnson's statement that Spears gave the order to "make it fit," 
is not hearsay because the statement is not offered "to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted," Utah R. Evid. 801(c), but rather 
merely to show that the statement was made, which tends to show 
that Spears was directing Carlson. See State v. Sorensen, 617 
P. 2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) ("When an out-of-court statement is 
offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to 
whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the 
hearsay rule."). Thus, McPherson's testimony "would be 
admissible in evidence" and is therefore proper under rule 56. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) . 
7. Wheeler argues that this language was in reference to an 
initial bid, and did not reflect the actual agreement between the 
parties. But because there is no final written agreement between 
the parties, this bid is to some extent evidence of the parties' 
intent regarding the installation. Indeed, the bid formed the 
basis of the parties' agreement, since the parties' final 
arrangement resulted from oral modifications to the bid. 
II. Product Liability 
IJll Wheeler argues that even assuming there are disputed issues 
of material fact, summary judgment was nonetheless proper because 
the two-year statute of limitations for product liability claims 
had run. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (2002). Wheeler argues 
that under the rule recognized in Strickland v. General Motors 
Corp. , 852 F. Supp. 956 (D. Utah 1994) , "all claims against a 
manufacturer, based on a defective product, [are] subject to [the 
product liability statute of limitations], regardless of the 
theory alleged. " Id. at 959 (emphasis added) . The City agrees 
that the product liability statute of limitations would apply to 
all claims--including negligence claims — arising out of a product 
defect, but argues that its claims arise out of negligent 
installation, thus making a four-year statute of limitations 
applicable. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (2002). The issue, 
then, is whether the defective installation alleged here is 
considered part of the product, thus making product liability 
analysis appropriate. 
Kl2 The Utah Product Liability Act provides that " [n] o product 
shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the 
manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or 
defective condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-15-6(1) (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, the after-sale 
negligent installation of a nondefective product does not give 
rise to a product liability claim. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., 
2002 UT 115,1(23, 61 P. 3d 1068 (stating that because a negligently 
installed machine was not defective when purchased, the case was 
one of negligence and not of product liability). 
Kl3 It is possible, however, for the installation to be 
considered part of the product if the installation occurred 
before sale. The opinion in Jamison v. Spencer R.V. Ctr., Inc., 
779 P.2d 1091 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), is illustrative of this point. 
In Jamison, the plaintiff purchased a trailer hitch, which the 
seller assembled and installed on plaintiff's truck. See id. at 
1092 . The assembly and installation allegedly included a weld 
within the hitch that subsequently failed and resulted in an 
accident. See id. The court determined that the claim was based 
on a product defect and was therefore a product liability claim. 
The court reasoned: "Those allegations [that the seller was 
negligent in assembling component parts], if proved, would show 
that assembly and installation of the trailer hitch created a 
defect in the hitch, resulting in a defective product being sold 
to plaintiff." Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted) . The court also 
specified that the assembly and customized installation were not 
"after-sale service" because "the alleged negligence occurred 
before the hitch was put into the stream of commerce"--i.e., the 
date the truck was picked up after the installation. Id. 
(emphasis in original). Thus, the court's focus, appropriately 
in our view, was on the condition of the product at the time of 
sale. 
1fl4 The facts of the instant case do not seem to fit the narrow 
situation in which installation work becomes integrated into the 
product itself. The City admits that "[t]he generator sets, 
including the accompanying mufflers, exhaust pipes, and other 
exhaust system components, were sold to the City as a single 
unit." But this is not enough to turn any claim involving those 
components into a product liability case. Instead, such would 
additionally require that the assembly and installation be 
performed by Wheeler before the systems were put into the stream 
of commerce, i.e., turned over to the City. This is clearly not 
what occurred here. Even assuming Wheeler was contractually 
responsible for the exhaust system installation, such 
installation did not happen prior to the sale, but was instead 
done after at least some control over the component parts had 
been relinquished to the City. 
Hl5 So although there are disputed facts as to which party was 
actually responsible for the exhaust system installation, it is 
nonetheless clear that the City was to some extent involved in 
the assembly and installation of the exhaust system. Thus, the 
product sold to the City was the various components of the 
generator system, which components were not defective at the time 
of sale. And the installation of the nondefective exhaust 
system--whether rendered by the City or its agent or by Wheeler 
or its agent--was an "after-sale" service. Id. Because the 
claims here are not product liability claims, but ultimately 
negligence claims, the statute of limitations had not run and the 
claims were timely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
fl6 There is admissible evidence that creates genuine issues of 
material fact, including the question of which party is liable 
for the exhaust system modifications. And because the claims 
here result from the after-sale installation of a nondefective 
product, they are not barred by the two-year product liability 
statute of limitations. Therefore, summary judgment was 
inappropriate, and we reverse and remand for trial or for such 
other proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
H17 I CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
1fl8 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT; 
[j&tU^C Russe l l W. Bench, 
P r e s i d i n g Judge 
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this action, the Court rules as set forth herein. 
FACTS 
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support of fa attempt to identify genuine issues of materia] fact. 
As examples of the first deficiency, the Court notes that (i) Plaintiff responds to paragraph 
1 of Defendant's statements of fact with a reference to its Amended Complaint, (ii) Plaintiff 
responds to paragraph 7 with reference to a document for which there is no foundation given, and 
(iii) Plaintiff repeatedly cites obviously inadmissible hearsay statements from the deposition of 
Richard McPherson. These responses do not meet the standards of Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
As one example of exaggeration, the Court notes that Plaintiff responds to Defendant's 
paragraph 10 with the statement that "Wheeler assisted in the development of the plans [for the 
City's new building]", but the deposition statements cited demonstrate only that Wheeler or 
Caterpillar provided the City and its engineers some drawings of the equipment Wheeler was selling 
to the City. As one example of misrepresentation, the Court notes Plaintiffs response to 
Defendant's paragraph 5—"Wheeler's bid included installation services"—for which Plaintiff cites 
the deposition statement of Mr. Sears that it was contemplated that Wheeler "will start up, 
commission and test the entire system;" Mr. Sears's testimony actually says nothing at all about 
installation, which is the critical issue in this case, and Plaintiffs citation is a misrepresentation of 
that testimony. 
The deficiencies of Plaintiff s opposing memorandum are clearly identified in Defendant's 
reply memorandum. Plaintiffs "Sur-Reply" memorandum is improper within summary judgment 
procedures and it is not considered by the Court. 
Consequently, the Court finds that the statements of fact in Defendant's supporting 
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memorandum are established without controversy for th, 
mroversy for the purposes of Defendant's motion.» 
ARGUMENTS 
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analysis of the issues. V™ent 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Court concludes as follows: 
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or a breach of any other form of contract. 
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its damages was not done by, at the direction of, under the control of, or pursuant to a design 
provided by Wheeler, and Wheeler has no duty with respect thereto. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Defendant's counsel 
should submit an appropriate judgment. 
Dated this PA day of May, 2005. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO. and ROES 1 
through 50, inclusive, j 
Defendants. j 
! ORDER OP DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
1 Civil No. 030501330 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Defendant Wheeler Machinery Co.'s ("Wheeler") Motion for Summary Judgment having 
come on hearing before the Honorable Judge G. Rand Beacham on the 23ri day of March, 2005, and 
Plaintiff being represented by its counsel Huey P. Cotton and Wheeler being represented by its 
counsel Joseph C. Rust, and the Court having reviewed the memoranda submitted by counsel, 
including affidavits, copies of depositions, and other pertinent materials, and the Court having heard 
oral argument and being fully briefed on the matter, and the Court having heretofore entered its 
2O05W26 PH3:ii8 
W A W / k ^ ; COUNTY 
Summary Ruling dated May 3.2005, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED. AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Wheeler's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons stated in the 
Court's Summary Ruling. 
2. In all respects. Plaintiffs Complaint against Wheeler is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Wheeler is awarded its costs of Court 
DATED this ?b> day of May. 200B. 
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Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Donald JAMISON, Appellant, 
v. 
SPENCER R.V. CENTER, INC., Respondent. 
86-1-137; CAA48523. 
Argued and Submitted April 21,1989. 
Decided Sept. 27, 1989. 
Owner of truck trailer brought suit against installer of hitch, following accident caused by failure of 
weld. The Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Sidney A. Brockley, J., granted installer's motion for 
summary judgment and truck owner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Warren, J., held that truck 
owner's action was in the nature of product liability suit, and eight-year statute of limitations applied. 
Affirmed. 
** 1091 *529 Craig O. West, Tualatin, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant. 
Thomas M. Christ, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Mitchell, 
Lang & Smith, Portland. 
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ. 
*531 WARREN, Judge. 
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment for defendant. The trial court ruled **1092 that the 
product liability statute of ultimate repose, ORS 30.905(1), rather than ORS 12.115, applies to 
plaintiffs claim. We affirm. 
On September 14,1976, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for the sale of a travel trailer. 
The contract included the sale and installation of an Eaz-Lift trailer hitch on plaintiffs truck, with 
which plaintiff intended to tow the trailer. The hitch was installed on September 29, 1976, and 
plaintiff picked up the truck the next day. According to the stipulated facts, the installation of the 
hitch consisted of the assembly, including welding, of component parts of the hitch assembly. 
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of defendant's negligence in installing the hitch, a weld failed in 
December, 1984, and plaintiff lost control of his truck and trailer resulting in an accident with two 
other vehicles and damage to both the truck and the trailer. The parties stipulated that the weld that 
allegedly failed was made during defendant's installation of the hitch. 
The question is whether the alleged negligence describes a "product liability civil action," as defined 
in ORS 30.900, Under ORS 30.905(1), such actions are barred, unless the injury complained of 
occurred within eight years of the date when the product was first purchased for use or consumption. 
Baird v. Electro Mart 47 Or.App. 565, 615 P.2d 335 (1980). In this case, the purchase occurred 
in September, 1976, more than eight years before the alleged injury in December, 1984. If plaintiff s 
claim is a "product liability civil action," it is barred. 
HI "Product liability civil action" is defined in ORS 30.900: 
"[A] civil action brought against a manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor of a product for damages 
for personal injury, death or property damage arising out of: 
"(1) Any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing or other defect in a product[.]" (Emphasis supplied.) 
Product liability "embraces all theories a plaintiff can adduce in an action based on a product defect," 
including theories of * 532 negligence. Marinelli v. Ford Motor Co.. 72 Or.App. 268,273,696 P.2d 
L rev. den., 299 Or. 251, 701 P.2d 784 (1985). (Emphasis in original.) 
[2] Plaintiff first argues that he has alleged negligent installation of a nondefective product, not a 
product defect, that negligence does not fall within the definition of ORS 30.900 and that, therefore, 
the ten-year limitation in ORS 12.115 applies. Defendant argues that plaintiff has alleged that, 
during negligent assembly of component parts, defendant created a product defect under ORS 
30.900, so that the eight-year limitation in ORS 30.905(1) applies. 
Plaintiff relies on Hoover v. Montgomery Ward. 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974). where the 
defendant had sold and mounted tires on the plaintiffs owned vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant had failed to tighten the lug nuts when the tires were mounted. The issue was whether 
strict liability applied to the facts. The court determined that the plaintiffs allegations described the 
negligent installation of a nondefective product, so that strict liability did not apply: 
"[I]t was not a dangerously defective tire which caused plaintiffs injuries, but rather the installation 
of the wheel on the hub and axle of the auto. In such case it might be said that plaintiffs auto became 
dangerously defective, but certainly not the tire." 270 Or. at 502-03, 528 P.2d 76. 
Although the possibility of imposing strict liability is not at issue in this case, that discussion of the 
definition of product defect is helpful. Plaintiffs complaint in this case included these allegations: 
"Defendant was negligent in the installation of the trailer hitch and receiver installed onto Plaintiffs 
1976 GMC pickup truck and 1976 Airstream Trailer in one or more of the following particulars: 
"(1) in failing to weld the receiver end of the trailer hitch system on all four sides of the box section 
to give the hitch system a proper and effective load bearing capability under the circumstances; 
"(2) in installing the stiffiner [ sic ] GTS bar with insufficient length to properly or effectively assist 
in the load bearing function of the hitch system; 
**1093 "(3) in welding the sleeve to tube areas of the hitch system with side welds of inadequate 
and insufficient strength *533 and size to properly or effectively assist in the load bearing function 
of the hitch system; 
&« $ $ $ $ * 
"As a result of Defendant's negligence, the trailer hitch and receiving member installed on Plaintiffs 
pickup was of less strength and durability than reasonable so that plaintiffs trailer hitch and 
receiving member became unwelded or bent * * * resulting in Plaintiff losing control [and causing 
the alleged damages]." 
The complaint includes allegations that the seller was negligent in assembling the component parts: 
making inadequate welds between the receiver end and the box section of the hitch system, installing 
a GTS stiffener bar that was too short and insufficient strength and size of the welds between the 
sleeve and tube areas of the hitch system. Those allegations, if proved, would show that assembly 
and installation of the trailer hitch created a defect in the hitch, resulting in a defective product being 
sold to plaintiff.— Those facts are different from those in Hoover, in which the plaintiff alleged no 
defect in the product itself, the tire. 
FN1. We do not distinguish defects created in the assembly of the trailer hitch from those 
made in the installation. The Eaz-Lift "instructional guide," included in the summary 
judgment record, required the installer to customize each installation to the make and model 
of each car. The seller's role in assembling the hitch is comparable to that of a manufacturer. 
ORS 30.900 applies to an action brought against any seller for damages arising from a defect in a 
product. The complaint alleges a product liability civil action, and the eight-year limitation applies. 
Plaintiff next argues that his claim is nevertheless not barred, because it is for negligence in "after-
sale" service. In Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Tech. Corp.. 303 Or. 281,735 P.2d 614 (19871 
more than eight years after the sale of the product, the seller-manufacturer gave negligent 
instructions about how long a helicopter part would last. The allegations of negligence were held not 
to describe a product liability claim. The court pointed out that the legislature did not intend that the 
product liability statutes apply to "some service department failure that resulted in an accident." 303 
Or. at 289, 735 P.2d 614. 
[3] [4] Plaintiff argues that, because the sales contract was *534 signed on September 14, but the 
work was not completed until September 29, the alleged negligence occurred after the sale. In 
Erickson Air-Crane Co., the Supreme Court stated that ORS 30.905 applies to "acts or omissions 
taking place before or at the time that the defendant places a product in the stream of commerce." 
303 Or. at 289, 735 P.2d 614. For a seller, that time does not begin until the product leaves the 
seller's hands, regardless of the date of the sale contract. Plaintiff has not alleged that he used the 
trailer hitch before it was assembled and installed on his truck. All of the alleged negligence occurred 
before the hitch was put into the stream of commerce on September 30. That was not after-sale 
service. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant sold him a defective product. 
Affirmed. 
